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Finding an Impetus for Institutional Change
at the African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights
By
Rebecca Wright*
I.
INTRODUCTION
In Aesop's fable, The Ant and the Chrysalis, an ant discovers a chrysalis in
a tree and derides it for being imprisoned in its shell, with "power only to move
a joint or two of your scaly tail." 1 One day, the butterfly emerges from its
bondage and flies off, leaving the ant with one clear lesson: evolution and
change are always possible.
At first glance, the ant's lesson appears inapplicable to the new African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (Court). Like the chrysalis, the Court has
been tightly bound. Its two founding treaties, the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights (African Charter) and the Protocol on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (Protocol establishing the Court), 2
staunchly protect state sovereignty, restricting the institution's power to act.
Individual access to the Court is only possible through state consent.
Requirements of confidentiality, amicable settlement and exhaustion of local
* Rebecca Wright is a J.D. student at the University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of
Law. She worked last semester in the Law School's International Human Rights Clinic, providing
recommendations for the redrafting of the Rules of Procedure for the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights. Thanks go to Ariel Meyerstein and Yvonne Troya, fellow students in
the Clinic, and to lbrahima Kane, the Clinic's partner at the Commission's Working Group. Mr.
Kane helped inspire the author's interest in human rights in Africa while she interned at
INTERIGHTS, London during the summer of 2005. Thanks are also due to Professors David Caron,
Andrew Guzman and Roxanna Altholz for conversations regarding this paper. All errors and
misconceptions are, of course, the author's responsibility.
I. The Ant and the Chrysalis, Aesop's Fables: Online Collection - Selected Fables, at
http://www.pacificnet.net/-johnr/aesop/aesopsel.html [hereinafter Ant and Chrysalis].
2. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.
5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/zlafchar.htm
[hereinafter African Charter]. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (1998), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/
courtprotocol2004.html [hereinafter Protocol establishing the Court].
Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
464 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AT THE AFRICAN COURT [Vol. 24:2
remedies allow states to avoid strict accountability. In addition, treaty-based
institutions are notoriously difficult to change and evolution is strongly resisted
once the power dynamics are locked in.3 Thus, it appears that the Court's "basic
genetic structure ... so limits the institution that it is, from the outset, destined
to fall short" 4 in its efforts to protect and promote human rights.5 This paper,
however, will explore one possible source for institutional change at the Court
that might enable it to overcome its genetic shortcomings: foreign aid
providers. 6 By linking aid provisions to demonstrated commitments to the
Court, this group of "other interested parties" 7 can provide a potential source for
growth. Observers may then find themselves as shocked as the ant, watching a
tightly bound entity discover the impetus to evolve.
This paper will analyze the development of the Court from the perspective
of rational design theory. While little of this literature addresses human rights
directly, the observation that "states use international institutions to further their
own goals, and... design institutions accordingly" is certainly applicable to
human rights mechanisms. 8 The fact that institutions are a product of conscious
state decision-making is evident in the treaties that establish the Court. State
power has been left supreme and individual member states have purposefully
restricted the ways they might be held accountable for human rights violations.
3. See, e.g., Cesare Romano & Chidi Odinkalu, Africa Won't Have a Second Chance to
Make a First Impression, "DO IT RIGHT:" NEWSL. OF AFR. CT. COALITION (Coalition for an
Effective Africa Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Nig., Afr.), 2004, at I (on file with author)
(noting how, "[flor courts like the African Court, established by treaty, it is often impossible to find
the majority support necessary to modify statutes and rules of procedure. They are documents that,
time and again, have proved remarkably resistant to change"); Barbara Koremenos et al., The
Rational Design ofInternational Institutions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761, 762 (2001) (observing how "Japan
and Germany play modest roles in the UN today because they have been unable to reverse the
decision made in 194445 to exclude them from the Security Council").
4. David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International Courts and Tribunals, 24
BERKELEY J. INT.'L L. 401,413 (2006).
5. The Preamble to the Protocol establishing the Court states that the Court should be created
to "complement and reinforce" the functions of the Commission. These functions are "on the one
hand promotion and on the other protection of Human and Peoples' Rights, freedom and duties."
Protocol establishing the Court, supra note 2, pmbl.
6. Foreign aid is also known as official development assistance (ODA) and is provided by
donor governments and multilateral institutions. The funding of regional human rights courts might
not be considered "foreign aid" according to some definitions because it is not aimed directly at
poverty reduction or macroeconomic policy. However, Steven Roper and Lilian Barria have
described how a broader definition of foreign aid has emerged that focuses on "conflict prevention
and resolution, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions,
promoting the rule of law and security sector reform." Providing foreign aid to a regional human
rights court would fall within this broader concept of foreign assistance. See Steven D. Roper &
Lilian A. Barria, Funding Institutions of Human Rights: Do International Tribunals Provide Good
Value?, Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
3 (Sept. 1-4, 2005), http://www.eiu.edu/-polisci/RoperBarriaAPSA.pdf.
7. David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International Courts and Tribunals, 24
BERKELEY J. INT.'L L. 401, 414 (2006).
8. Koremenos, supra note 3, at 762 (emphasis omitted). In an additional article, Koremenos
et al. concluded that "the preliminary evidence suggests that our hypotheses will also apply to the
human rights area." Barbara Koremenos et al., Rational Design: Looking Back to Move Forward, 55
INT'L ORG. 1051, 1062 (2001).
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Thus, the nature of the game needs to be altered so that an incentive for change
is provided. This is where foreign aid can play a role.
Apart from the evolution that occurs as a result of the "purposeful
decisions" of state actors,9 rational design theory does not tend to take account
of the possibility for institutional change. 10 This paper, then, contributes to this
body of scholarship by demonstrating how an outside influence can shift states'
interests, resulting ultimately in a judicial institution that serves functions
unintended in its initial design. Part I provides a background to the development
of the Court, demonstrating how the protection of state sovereignty has long
been a priority in Africa's regional human rights system. Part II describes the
restrictive nature of the Court's constituent instruments and how they limit the
effective protection of human rights. It will compare a few key features of the
African Court with the practices of the European and Inter-American Human
Rights Courts and will suggest how the Protocol establishing the Court could
have been made less restrictive. Part III will address how, as a group of other
interested parties or "outsiders" with significant economic leverage over African
nations, foreign aid donors could cause the Court to evolve. Although it is
difficult to assess all the motivations underpinning the decision to grant foreign
aid, the major donors have already begun to make their aid conditional on a
respect for human rights--or at least conditional on efforts towards establishing
good governance and rule of law. This last Part will provide concrete
suggestions for the ways in which aid could be tied to institutional development.
Among the proposals discussed at the end of this paper are the need for
individuals to have direct access to the Court and the need for a clear statement
that domestic remedies should be fair and effective before they require
exhaustion. Such measures will enable the Court to engage in "effective"
adjudication by allowing it "to compel a party to a dispute to defend aainst a
plaintiffs complaint and to comply with the resulting judgment." Other
functions, however, include strengthening the domestic courts and human rights
institutions within Africa and providing a motivating focal point for African
civil society. Only by fulfilling these latter two functions will the Court ensure
that the human rights of African individuals are protected.
9. According to rational design theory, the evolution of institutions only occurs in two
situations: first, when states make "purposeful decisions as new circumstances arise"; second, when
states begin to select a particular institution above others, favoring a specific institutional design.
Koremenos, supra note 3, at 767.
10. In her article on international criminal tribunals, for example, Allison Danner noted how
rational design scholars often assume that the interests of states remain constant. Danner explored
ways in which institutional development can occur in unintended and irreversible ways so that courts
perform functions not anticipated by the creating states. Such unintended evolution is, of course, a
possibility for the African Court, but Danner's theory is not predictive and will probably only be
applicable over a long time period. Allison Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International
Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), Vanderbilt
Public Law Research Paper No. 05-30, available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=822809.
11. This definition of "effectiveness" is the one used by Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie
Slaughter in their article on supranational adjudication. Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 283 (1997).
2006]
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This whole paper is, of course, based on the premise that regional human
rights courts are important institutions and that it is beneficial to have them
functioning effectively. The Inter-American Court, established in 1979, has
succeeded in persuading governments to release individuals who have been
unjustly imprisoned. It has also successfully ordered governments to pay
compensation to families who have lost members through human rights
violations. 12 Even more impressive is the history of the European human rights
system that was established in 1953, with the current version of the European
Court of Human Rights created in 1998.13 In 2000, Mary Robinson commented
that: "The [European] Convention and Court have.., played a key role in
increasing human rights awareness and in the promotion and protection of
human rights" in the region.
14
Within Europe, states have been provided with economic incentives to
protect human rights. No country has joined the European Union without first
being a member of the Council of Europe, an "institutional watchdog of human
rights principles, pluralistic democracy and the rule of law." 15 The fact that
increased human rights protection is a prerequisite for membership in the
European Union is a motivating factor that has played a significant role in the
development of the human rights system in Europe. It is clear that African states
would like to replicate the type of economic success achieved through the
European Union, and ultimately the African region might be capable of
providing its own economic incentives for human rights protection. 16 Presently,
however, there is a dire lack of resources within the region and a number of
organizational weaknesses. Bronwen Manby, for example, has noted that, while
the regional group New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
contains human rights commitments for member states, the organization "has
12. Peru, for example, complied with the Court's order to release Maria Elena Loayza
Tamayo from prison following the decision in Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (1997). States have also
amended domestic laws following decisions by the Inter-American Court. See JO M. PASQUALUCCI,
THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 8-9 (2003).
13. The European Human Rights system was established in 1953 when the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was ratified. The European Commission
of Human Rights was established in 1954 and the limited Court of Human Rights was created in
1959. The current European Court of Human Rights (which replaces the dual system of Commission
and Court) was created in 1998 by Protocol 11, an amendment to the Convention.
14. Mary Robinson, Address of the [United Nations] High Commissioner for Human Rights
at the European Convention on Human Rights (Nov. 4, 2000), http://www.unhchr.ch
/huricane/huricane.nsf/ 0/F9DAEB800238EB3DC125698F00563E7C?opendocument.
15. See Europa, The EU's Relations with the Council of Europe,
http://europa.cu.int/comm/external-relations/coe/. As Christina Hioureas' paper in this volume
demonstrates, the European Court now has so many applications that it is almost a victim of its own
success. Christina Hioureas, Behind the Scenes of Protocol 14: Politics in Reforming the European
Court of Human Rights, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 718 (2006).
16. Rachel Murray has noted how the AU takes "the wider political and economic view that
the EU now encompasses," observing that "it was the EU that was said to have served as the AU's
model." RACHEL MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: FROM THE OAU TO THE AFRICAN UNION 31
(2004).
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol24/iss2/4
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significant deficiencies" and so is unable to enforce these commitments. 17 As a
result, economic incentives will need, at this present time, to come from an
outside actor such as foreign donors.
II.
A HISTORY OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE GENESIS OF THE AFRICAN COURT
This Part will give a brief history of the regional human rights system in
Africa, describing the main organizations and developments. It will begin by
looking at the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) and will
then consider the African Charter and the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights (Commission). Finally, it will describe the negotiations that led
to the adoption of the Protocol establishing the Court. This history emphasizes
the ways in which the African states have succeeded in protecting their
sovereignty within their regional human rights system.
A. The Organization of African Unity/African Union
The Court is a creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which
has now transformed into the African Union (AU). The Charter of the OAU
entered into force on September 13, 1963 and provided for a "supreme organ"
called the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG). 18 The
principal concern underlying the OAU Charter was the determination to protect
the newly acquired statehood of many African countries. In fact, as Claude
Welch has noted, the OAU was created "in a context of nearly untrammeled
state sovereignty, in which heads of state sought sedulously to safeguard the
independence so recently won."' 19 Article III of the OAU Charter set out the
principles to which the Member States agreed to adhere: first was "[t]he
sovereign equality of all member states"; second was "[n]on-interference in the
internal affairs of states. ' 20 Any disputes between the states were to be resolved
using negotiation, mediation or arbitration.2 1 At this point, the focus was clearly
on the protection of the state and not the individual. As a result, the "sovereignty
principle, together with the non-interference principle - the reserve domain -
became the identity symbol of the organization. The organization, thus, became
a personality club in perpetual mutual adoration." 22
Given that the heads of state who were themselves responsible for massive
17. Bronwen Manby, The African Union, NEPAD, and Human Rights: The Missing Agenda,
26 HuM. RTs. Q. 983 (2004).
18. Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, art. VIII, available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/OAU-Charter_1993.html [hereinafter OAU Charter].
19. Claude E. Welch, The African Commission on Human and Peoples'Rights: A Five- Year
Report and Assessment, 14 HuM. RTS. Q. 43 (1992).
20. OAU Charter, supra note 18, art. 111(1), (2).
21. OAU Charter, supra note 18, art. 111(3).
22. Nsongurua J. Udombana, An African Human Rights Court and an African Union Court:
A Needful Duality or a Needless Duplication?, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 811, 819 (2003).
2006]
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human rights abuses traditionally led the OAU, it was no surprise that the
organization strongly supported the principle of non-intervention. Idi Amin, for
example, who was a dictator in Uganda during a notorious reign of terror, was
elected as the chairman of the OAU in June 1975. Amin killed thousands of his
countrymen after overthrowing the elected government of Milton Obote. One
Ugandan Anglican bishop, Festo Kivengere, angrily commented after Amin's
election in 1975 that: "At the very moment the heads of state were meeting in
the conference hall, talking about the lack of human rights in southern Africa,
three blocks away, in Amin torture chambers, my countrymen's heads were
being smashed with sledge hammers and their legs being chopped off with
axes." 23 Increasing political repression, denial of political choice, restrictions on
freedom of association and other human rights violations met with rare murmurs
of dissent from within the OAU.24
In the late 1990s, there was a growing momentum to replace the OAU with
an organization that was able to handle modem political tensions and to address
matters of economic and social concern. In September 1999, an Extraordinary
Summit of the Heads and State of Government of the OAU was held in Sirte by
the invitation of the Libyan leader, Colonel Ghaddafi.2 5 This meeting resulted in
the Sirte Declaration, which stated that: "[O]ur continental Organization (OAU)
needs to be revitalized in order to be able to play a more active role and continue
to be relevant to the needs of our peoples and responsive to the demands of the
prevailing circumstances." 2 6 The Heads of State and Government decided to
establish the AU so that it could, among other things, work towards
"[s]trengthening and consolidating the Regional Economic Communities as the
pillars for achieving the objectives of the African Economic Community." 2 7 As
a result, the OAU adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU Act)
in July 2000.28 The AU Act entered into force in May 2001. At this point, the
OAU was, as Time Europe commented, "mercifully killed off by its member
states."
29
23. George B.N. Ayittey, Idi Amin Lives, ProfileAfrica, Jan. 24, 2004, www.profile
africa.com/Search 195.htm.
24. See, e.g., U.O. Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples'Rights, 77 AM.
J. INT'L L. 902, 903 (1983) (noting that massacres of thousands of Hum in Burundi in 1972-73, as
well as repressive regimes in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea and the Central African Republic, "were
neither discussed nor condemned by the OAU, which regarded them as matters of internal affairs.").
25. Some commentators have expressed distrust regarding Colonel Ghaddafi's leadership
role in the OAU transformation process. As one reporter commented: "Doubt ... hangs over the
intentions of the Libyan leader ... there were worries expressed in whispers in Lusaka about
whether the Guide of the Libyan Revolution could really be the helmsman of the continental
revolution. Questions are being asked about Al-Gaddafi's motives." Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, From
OAU to AU - Whither Africa?, ALLAFRICA.COM, July 13, 2001, http://allafrica.com/s
tories/200107130178.html.
26. OAU, Sirte Declaration, Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government (Sept. 8-9, 1999), http://www.un.int/libya/sirte-dc.htm.
27. Id.
28. Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15, available at
http://vwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/africa/auconst-act2001 .html [hereinafter AU Act].
29. Peter Hawthorne, All for One, One for All: The Organization of African Unity is dead,
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol24/iss2/4
DOI: doi:10.15779/Z38Z94R
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The AU Act establishes the AU as a political, economic and social
organization. Its political organ is the Assembly of the Union comprised of the
members' Heads of State and Government. Whereas respect for sovereignty and
the commitment to "non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs
of another" are still included as important principles in the AU Act, there is
some effort towards limiting these assumptions." Article 4(h), for example,
provides the "right... to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of
the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide
and crimes against humanity." 3 1 While the AU has intervened in some ways-
mediating, for example, peace talks in Abuja between the Sudanese government
and the two rebel groups, and monitoring a humanitarian ceasefire in Darfur
since June 2004 32 -it still does not aggressively condemn human rights abuses
and states do not appear wary of AU disapproval. In January 2006, Muthoni
Wanyeki lamented the AU's ineffectiveness, commenting how:
It allowed us to feel proud about our capacity to resolve our own problems when
it intervened in Togo following the death of one of those few remaining African
presidents who went on and on and on .... But, its duty apparently done, it sat
back and did nothing about the post-election fallout. And, of course, it has said
nothing on the deteriorating situation in Swaziland. Or on the situation in
Zimbabwe.
33
The same month, Human Rights Watch made similar observations.
3 4
long live the African Union. Better luck this time?, TIME EUROPE, July 14, 2002, available at
http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/O, 13005,901020722-320737,00.html.
30. AU Act, supra note 28, art. 4(g).
31. AU Act, supra note 28, art. 4(h).
32. The AU established an African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and provided almost
7,000 troops to protect civilians in Sudan. This is the AU's largest ever military operation. See
Submission to the 38 h Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Nov. 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/l1/19/africal2060.htm.
Britain recently pledged more money to support the AMIS, noting that: "Despite its limited capacity,
the 6,964-strong AMIS force, which was deployed in Darfur in August 2004, has been credited with
helping to improve security in the region and enabling humanitarian agencies to deliver aid to those
affected by the conflict." Sudan: Britain to Give Additional Funding to AU Mission, IRIN
NEWS.ORG, Feb. 22, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=51846&SelectRegion=
East Africa. But see No Power to Protect: Increase Troops, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL,
http:/www.refugeesintemational.org/section/publications/au troops/ (arguing that "AMIS needs
more troops on the ground to effectively fulfill their mandate").
33. L. Muthoni Wanyeki, A U's Dismal Date in Khartoum, THE EAST AFRICAN (Kenya), Jan.
17, 2006, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200601171013.html.
34. In addition to commenting on the situation in Togo and Zimbabwe, Human Rights
Watch stated:
In the DRC, the A.U. has spoken of addressing the politically sensitive issue of foreign
combatants in the country but has yet to act. In the Ivory Coast, the A.U. has downplayed
issues of justice and accountability that are likely to prove essential to a lasting
peace. Meanwhile, certain powerful leaders, such as Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of
Ethiopia, escaped A.U. pressure altogether, even as he, unwilling to accept opposition gains
in the country's first contested elections in May, led the police to kill scores of
demonstrators and arrest thousands of opposition supporters.
Darfur and the African Union, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Jan. 2006, http://www.hrw.org/
wr2k6/introduction/I 0.htm.
2006]
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B. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
Despite these problems, Africa does have a regional human rights treaty
that will be integral to the functioning of the, new African Court. This treaty is
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights which was adopted by the
OAU in 1981 and came into force in 1986.35 All AU states are now a party to
this treaty. 3 6 While this Charter was heralded as a major advance in the human
rights system in Africa, 3 7 it contains provisions that make state sovereignty
supreme. For example, there are a number of "claw back clauses" that remove,
or at least severely restrict, the human rights protections. 38 Article 6 states that:
"No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions
previously laid down by the law."' 3 9 Article 8 reads: "Freedom of conscience, the
profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject
to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these
freedoms. ' 4° Many states in Africa have laws that directly restrict rights such as
freedom of speech and freedom of conscience. For example, Article 46 of the
new Algerian Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation prohibits, among
other things, public debate regarding the atrocities committed during the past
decade of internal conflict.4 1 Article 21 of the Libyan Constitution states that
35. African Charter, supra note 2.
36. All African states apart from Morocco are members of the African Union. Morocco was
forced to withdraw from the OAU in 1984 because it refused to recognize the Polisario movement's
claim to the territory of Western Sahara. For an account of a 2001 proposal to allow Morocco to
rejoin the OAU, see David Bamford, OAU Considers Morocco Readmission, BBC NEWS, July 8,
2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/1428796.stm.
37. Kofi Oteng Gufuor has noted that: "The Banjul Charter was a turning point in the
protection of human rights in Africa. Though the subject of much criticism, the Banjul Charter is still a
landmark human rights treaty as, prior to its adoption, human rights were seen as issues within the
domestic jurisdiction of the OAU's Members." Kofi Oteng Gufuor, Human Rights in Africa: Interpreting
and Understanding the Organization of African Unity's Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action,
University of East London Law Research Paper, 5-6, http://www.uel.ac.uk/law/research/publi
cations/documents/grandbay.doc.
38. Most human rights treaties contain limitation or derogation clauses that provide specific
circumstances in which states can limit or derogate from the rights guaranteed. However, as the
Centre for Human Rights in the University of Pretoria has noted, claw back clauses are unique in
that, claw back clauses have the effect of restricting rights ab initio. It [sic] undermines the
proclaimed rights by granting states unqualified powers to infringe upon certain rights. Claw back
clauses are therefore less precise because the restrictions are discretionary as it subject [sic] human
rights to domestic laws. The negative aspect of this is that governments are traditionally the most
frequent violators of human rights, and they also have the power to make and change laws. By
inserting clauses that permit rights to be limited by domestic law, the Charter makes human rights
vulnerable to those very institutions that attack them most often.
Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, African Human Rights System, http://www.chr.up.
ac.za/centre publications/ahrs/african-charterhtml.
39. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 6 (emphasis added).
40. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 8 (emphasis added). Such claw back clauses are also
contained in Articles 9, 10, 11 and 14. For an analysis of these provisions, see Nsongurua J.
Udombana, Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Better Late Than Never, 3
YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 45, 63 (2000).
41. Article 46 reads: "Anyone who, by speech, writing, or any other act, uses or exploits the
wounds of the National Tragedy to harm the institutions of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, to weaken the state, or to undermine the good reputation of its agents who honorably served
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol24/iss2/4
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"freedom of conscience is absolute," but adds that foreigners have "the right
freely to practice religion so long as it is not a breach of public order and is not
contrary to morality." 42 These types of laws, which are not uncommon
throughout Africa, make the claw back clauses in the African Charter a concrete
problem.
4 3
C. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
Part II of the African Charter calls for the creation of an eleven-member
independent Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (Commission). The
Commission's mandate is "to promote human and peoples' rights and ensure
their protection in Africa." 4 4 While the Commission has recently begun to
challenge state sovereignty by allowing representation by NGOs and individuals
and by declaring that provisional measures are binding,45 it is severely restricted
by a number of factors. First is the problem that the states generally refuse to
cooperate with the Commission, both during hearings and during
it, or to tarnish the image of Algeria internationally, shall be punished by three to five years in prison
and a fine of 250,000 to 500,000 dinars." See Algeria: New Amnesty Law Will Ensure Atrocities Go
Unpunished, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar. 1, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/ 2006/03/ 01/
algeri 12743.htm.
42. CONSTITUTION, Art. 21 (Libya), available at http://www.libyanconstitutionalunion.
net/constitution%20of/20libya.htm.
43. Vincent Nmehielle, however, has claimed that while the criticisms leveled against the
claw back clauses are well founded, the Commission has not in practice implemented these clauses:
The African Commission has, in fact, variously rejected that interpretation [that the claw
back clauses allow domestic law to trump international human rights standards], and
reinforced the overarching reach of international human rights law, which does not succumb
to flimsy domestic laws or regulations that tend to limit the enjoyment of human rights
protection without cause, or in a very irregular situation. In a series of cases consolidated in
Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria the Commission set the
standard for reviewing state limitation of human rights.
Vincent Nmehielle, Development of the African Human Rights System in the Last Decade, 11 HUM.
RTS. BRIEF 6, 7 (2004). Despite this observation, the claw back clauses do provide states with a legal
justification for avoiding human rights obligations and signify a worrying protection of state
sovereignty. While they are still present in the African Charter, there is always a danger that they
could be used as a defense.
44. African Charter, supra note 2, at art. 30.
45. In the Sixteenth Ordinary Session, held in October 1994, the Commission stated in
paragraph forty-eight that: "It should be pointed out that for the first time victims of human rights
violations or their representatives came to defend their cause before the African Commission." The
Commission heard the author of the communication for Louis Emgba Mekongo v. Cameroon. Final
Communique, Sixteenth Ordinary Session, Afr. Comm'n on Hum. Peoples' Rts. (25 Oct.-3 Nov.,
1994), http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/achpr l6f.html. With regard to provisional measures, in
International PEN and Others v. Nigeria, the Commission stated that "in ignoring its obligations to
institute provisional measures, Nigeria has violated Article I [of the African Charter]." This
statement indicated that, in the view of the Commission, provisional measures were mandatory, a
declaration that challenged Nigeria's sovereignty (even though Nigeria ignored the Commission's
decision). International PEN and Others v. Nigeria, Aft. Comm'n Hum. & Peoples' Rts., Comm.
Nos. 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97, holding (1998), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humnrts/aflica/comcases/ 37-94_139-94_154-96_161-97.html [hereinafter
International PEN].
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investigations. 46 Second, the Commission lacks independence because it is
integrally linked with the African Heads of State and Government. The eleven
Commissioners, for example, are "elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government, from a list of persons nominated by the States
Parties.' 4 7 Third, the work of the Commission is shrouded in secrecy, making
any kind of external monitoring difficult. Article 59 states that: "All measures
taken within the provisions of the present Chapter shall remain confidential until
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise decide."
48
Fourth, individual access to the Commission is difficult. Communications
received from non-state parties must "relate to special cases which reveal the
existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and peoples'
rights.' 4 9 In addition, such communications cannot be "written in disparaging or
insulting language," a provision that the Commission has, at times, strictly
applied. In Ligue Camerounaise des droits de l'homme v. Cameroon, for
example, the Commission ruled that phrases such as "regime of torturers" and
"government barbarisms" constituted the type of insulting language referred to
in Article 56. 50 The Commission therefore held the communication
inadmissible, despite the complainant's credible allegations of serious and
massive human rights violations. 5 1 Finally, the Commission is restricted by a
dire lack of funds. This has been acknowledged by the OAU/AU on a number of
occasions. For example, in 1989, the AHSG asked the Secretary-General of the
OAU to "find, prior to next financial year, appropriate solutions to the
budgetary, financial and personnel problems raised by the African
Commission." 52 For these reasons, the Commission has been dismissed by
many critics as a "toothless bulldog" that was never "created to bite."
53
46. In International PEN, Nigeria ignored the Commission's demands that the defendant
should not be harmed pending the trial and he was executed before the Commission ruled that the
defendant was not guilty. International PEN, supra note 45, paras. 8, 9 (describing how the
Commission had invoked interim measures against Nigeria asking that the executions of Ken Saro-
Wiwa and others be suspended but how Nigeria had carried out the executions without responding to
this request).
47. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 33.
48. Id. art. 59.
49. Id. art. 58.
50. Ligue Camerounaise des droits de l'homme v. Cameroon, Aft. Comm'n Hum. &
Peoples' Rts., Comm. No. 65/92, para. 13 (1997), available at
http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/65-92.html [hereinafter Ligue Camerounaisel.
51. Id. para. 1 (describing how the complaint documented ways in which the prison
conditions in Cameroon constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and how there was
additional evidence of, among other things, "massacres of the civilian population").
52. OAU, Resolution Relating to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,
AHSG, Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (24-26 July, 1989), AHG/Res. 188 (XXV), available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/hog/yHoGAssemblyl 989.pdf. For a
description of the Commission's appeals for money, see MURRAY, supra note 16, at 55-57.
53. Udombana, supra note 40, at 64.
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D. Negotiations Toward an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
It was the ineffectiveness of the Commission in protecting human rights in
Africa that led to the creation of the Court. In 1993, the International
Commission of Jurists (ICJ), under the auspices of Abdou Diouf, President of
Senegal and then chairman of the OAU Assembly, convened a meeting ofjurists
and human rights specialists to address the failures of the Commission.
Following the brainstorming session, several other meetings of experts were
convened under the direction of the ICJ, together with the OAU and the
Commission.5 4 These meetings led to the creation of Resolution 230 which was
adopted in the Thirtieth Ordinary Session of the AHSG of the OAU in June
1994. This Resolution expressed concern regarding, "the situation obtaining in
the area of Human and Peoples' Rights" and requested that "the OAU Secretary-
General to convene a meeting of government experts to ponder in conjunction
with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights over the means to
enhance the efficiency of the Commission in considering particularly the
establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights." 55
This Resolution was followed by a number of meetings held between the
OAU and international experts. A draft Protocol was first submitted by the OAU
Secretary-General to the Conference of Governmental Experts in Cape Town,
South Africa, in September 1995. The draft Protocol that emerged from this
session is referred to as the "Cape Town Draft." A second meeting was held in
Nouakchott, Mauritania in April 1997 and resulted in a draft referred to as the
"Nouakchott Draft." At this point, governments had only participated in the
drafting process in a limited way and this deficiency led to a final meeting in
December 1997, accompanied by an appeal for more state input to try to finalize
the draft.56 The final version of the Protocol establishing the Court was then
recommended for adoption by the OAU.
The comments made by states during this drafting process emphasized the
reluctance of African states to have an external regional body passing judgment
on their domestic affairs. This attitude can be seen in part from the way they
emphasized that the "proper" (i.e. traditional) way to resolve disputes within
Africa was through mediation rather than through contentious proceedings. In
1995, the South African newspaper Sowetan stated that, in Africa,
"[c]onventional wisdom then, as now, was that it was improper and a sign of bad
neighborliness to intervene in the internal affairs of others." 5 7 This type of
"conventional wisdom" was emphatically expressed in a letter written in the
54. For more information on this NGO process, see Julia Harrington, The African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: THE
SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986-2000, 308 (Malcolm D. Evans & Rachel Murray eds., 2002).
55. OAU, Resolution on the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, AHSG,
Thirtieth Ordinary Session (13-15 June, 1994), AHG/Res. 230 (XXX), para. 4, available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/resafchar30th.html
56. See Harrington, supra note 54, at 312-13 (discussing the lack of state participation in the
drafting process and how this probably led to the final and third meeting of governmental experts).
57. Editorial, SOWETAN (S. Aft.), Sept. 6, 1995, at 10 (on file with author).
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same year to the Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU. Edwin Maepe, of the
International Metalworkers Institute, called for the OAU to focus on mediation
at a "[h]igh powered level," rather than on a regional court. According to
Maepe, "African states will respond more positively in my opinion to a
mediatory approach rather than an adjudicative approach." 58 Maepe was
particularly concerned that judicial condemnation of human rights abuses was
ineffective; in his view, "to think that Africa's problem can be solved by passing
judgements on members states is rather outrageous." 5 9
The Secretary-General of the ICJ has also referred to Africa's traditional
emphasis on mediation in a 1995 speech. Discussing the lengthy process that
was required to create an African Court, he noted that: "The refusal to create an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, no doubt, had a philosophical
explanation. Generally, it is during open-floor discussions that consensus is
reached regarding conflict directed towards individuals or clans. Traditional
African justice is essentially conciliatory." 60
However, the ICJ Secretary-General was also careful to note that the
"delights of traditional anthropology should not lull us to the point of obscuring
reality." 6 1 Mediation was not sufficient to address human rights abuses and so
victims of these violations should "have recourse to judicial process on
demand."'62 Indeed, a number of judicial developments within Africa make it
difficult to maintain that mediation alone is the African way. For one, the
reliance on domestic constitutional courts has been said to have paved the way
for the creation of an African court. 63 In addition, the strong regional support for
the African Court of Justice and the active participation of many African nations
in the creation of the ICC indicate that litigation is a well-accepted method of
resolving disputes within the continent.
64
However, despite indications that African states no longer rely upon
mediation as the sole means of solving disputes, the desire to avoid contentious
proceedings was clearly a motive that helped to shape the Court. For example, in
comments made in 1996, the Government of Tunisia called for an explicit
statement to be included in the Protocol declaring that the Court "shall attempt
to assist the parties in arriving at an amicable settlement."65 The reason this
58. Letter from Edwin Maepe, International Metalworks Federation, to Ahmed Haggag,
Assistant Secretary General of the OAU and to International Jurists, Switzerland (Sept. 26, 1995)
(on file with author).
59. Id.
60. Adama Dieng, Secretary-General for the International Commission of Jurists, Speech
given at the Meeting of Government Experts on the Question of the Creation of an African Court For
Human and Peoples' Rights, Cape Town, South Africa (Sept. 6-12, 1995), at 4 (on file with author).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Frans Viljoen, A Human Rights Court for Africa, and Africans, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 1, 9 (2004).
64. Frans Viljoen argued that: "African enthusiasm and participation in establishing the ICC,
and its entry into force in 2002 ... left its mark on the parallel process of establishing the African
Human Rights Court." Id. at 12.
65. OAU, Report of the Secretary-General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of an
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statement was necessary, noted the Tunisian Government, was "to highlight the
fact that the purpose of the Court is to ensure respect for human rights and not to
deliver a judgement condemning a State. If it succeed [sic] in achieving its end
through prior reconciliation, it would have carried out the preventive role
assigned to it." 6 6 A provision on amicable settlement was not included in the
Cape Town Draft, but it was added to the Nouakchott Draft, presumably in
response to Tunisia's comments.
An even more emphatic way to avoid interference with state sovereignty
was to deny individuals direct access to the Court. The provision on individual
access was one of the most contentious in the whole Protocol establishing the
Court and provoked a number of comments by states. In the first draft produced
after the Cape Town meeting, Articles 5 and 6 dealt with locus standi. Article 5
allowed two groups to submit cases to the Court: the Commission and the "State
Party which had lodged a complaint to the Commission." 6 7 Article 6 then
provided for "exceptional jurisdiction" which read: "Notwithstanding the
provisions of Article 5, the Court may, on exceptional grounds, allow
individuals, non-governmental organisations and groups of individuals to bring
cases before the Court, without first proceeding under Article 55 of the
Charter."6
8
This type of language undoubtedly reflects the influence of NGOs who
were instrumental in creating the first draft of the Protocol. 69 African states,
however, were determined that such extensive locus standi should be avoided.
In March 1996, for example, Mauritius expressed concern that Article 6 would
bring "a risk of inundation of the Court by applications from international
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Annex III: Comments from Member States, Annex
Ill(e) Tunisia, Sixty-Fifth Ordinary Session (Feb. 24-28, 1997), CM11996 (LXV), available at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre-publications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS%20LEADING%20UP
%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%200F%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p. 170.
doc.
66. Id.
67. OAU, Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, produced at Government Legal
Experts Meeting on the Question of the Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples'
Rights (Sept. 6-12, 1995), Cape Town, South Africa, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR(I), available at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre-publications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS%20LEADfNG%20UP
%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%200F%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p. 170.
doc.
68. Article 55 of the Charter stipulates that, before every session of the Commission, the
Secretary has to make a list of communications submitted by individuals and NGOs and transmit
them to the members of the Commission. Such communications are then considered by the
Commission "if a simple majority of its members so decide." African Charter, supra note 35, at art.
55.
69. Julia Harrington has noted that the 1995 Cape Town draft was not, in fact, the first
version of the Protocol. Rather, "a draft protocol for an African court had first been made by Karl
Vasak, a Czech jurist, in 1993, at the request of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), an
NGO based in Geneva." Harrington, supra note 54, at 308. For a copy of the early NGO draft, see
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centrejpublications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS%20LEADING%20UP
%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%200F%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p. 170.
doc.
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watchdogs." 70 Egypt also expressed a reservation to this Article, providing two
grounds for its objections: first, that it would undermine the work of the
Commission, and second that it would "risk opening a wider discussion on the
interpretation of article 55 of the Charter, which so far, had been interpreted by
the Commission, as allowing individual complaints and not just 'situation'
complaints." 7 1 In the next round of negotiations, Burkina Faso supported
Egypt's statements and said that "individuals, non-governmental organizations
and individual groups should first refer their issues to the Commission," 72 a
sentiment that was also reiterated by Madagascar. 73 These types of responses
led to the rewriting of Article 6 in the Nouakchott Draft in such a way that
individual access became conditional upon each State making an optional
declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive such petitions.
74
Despite such hesitations, on June 8, 1998, the Thirty-Fourth Summit of the
Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted the Protocol on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. It came into
force in January 2004 when the Protocol received the requisite number of
ratifications. 75 At the beginning of 2006, the eleven judges were elected. 7 6
70. OAU, Report of the Secretary-General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Annex Ill: Comments from Member States, Annex
111(a) Mauritius, Sixty-Fifth Ordinary Session (Feb. 24-28, 1997), CM/1996 (LXV), available at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre-publications/hria/references/DOCUMENTS%20LEADING%20UP
%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%200F%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p. 170.
doc.
71. OAU, Annex 1: Report of the Government Experts Meeting on the Establishment of an
African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (Sept. 6-12, 1995), OAU/LEGIEXP/AFC/HPR/RPT(I)
Rev.l, available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre publications/hrla/references/ DOCUMENTS
%20LEADING%20UP%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%200F%20THE%20AFRICAN
%20COURT%20p. I 70.doc.
72. OAU, Report of the Secretary-General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Annex IlI: Comments from Member States, Annex
I11(c) Burkina Faso, Sixty-Fifth Ordinary Session (Feb. 24-28, 1997), CM/I 996 (LXV), available at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre-publications/hria/references/DOCUMENTS%20LEADING%20UP
%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%200F%20THE%20AFRCAN%20COURT%20p. 170.
doc. Despite the reservations mentioned here, Burkina Faso is in fact the only country that has made
a declaration accepting direct individual and NGO access to the Court.
73. OAU, Report of the Secretary-General on the Draft Protocol on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Annex Ill: Comments from Member States, Annex
111(i) Madagascar, Sixty-Fifth Ordinary Session (Feb. 24-28, 1997), CM/1996 (LXV), available at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centrepublications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS /20LEAD1NG/ 20UP
%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT /o200F%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p. 170.
doc (noting concerns about how Article 6 would "reduce the importance of the role of the
Commission").
74. OAU, Draft (Nouakchott) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, produced at the Second
Government Legal Experts Meeting on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights (Apr. 11-14, 1997), Nouakchott, Mauritania, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PRO (2),
available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centrepublications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS/20LEA
DING%20UP%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%200F%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COU
RT%20p. 170.doc.
75. A minimum of fifteen ratifications was required before the Protocol entered into force.
As of March 2006, twenty-one countries have ratified the Protocol establishing the Court. These are
Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, C6te d'lvoire, the Comoros, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya,
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol24/iss2/4
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Ultimately, according to comments made to Reuters by Ibrahima Kane, the
Court "will be situated in East Africa, with Mauritius the most likely location,
and should be in place by July [2006] with an initial annual budget of $2.25
million." 7
7
III.
THE RESTRICTIVE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUENT INSTRUMENTS
In 1995, the Assistant-General of the OAU, Ambassador Ahmed Haggag,
emphasized that "no continent and no people have experienced so much agony
and suffering as a result of massive violations of human rights." 7 8 Emphasizing
that the "oneness of humanity and the universality of human rights cannot be
denied," Haggag ultimately called for "collective action at the national, regional
and international level."' 79 Thus, Haggag suggested that one motive for the
African states in creating a Court should be to eradicate individual suffering, a
goal that would rise above state sovereignty. However, as discussed above, this
motive did not triumph during the writing of the Protocol establishing the Court.
Instead, the protection of state sovereignty remained the principle concern-a
concern that is evident in the Court's institutional design.
80
This Part will focus on four principal features of the Court's constituent
instruments that may impede its evolution into a functioning human rights
mechanism. The first and most important feature is the lack of individual access.
Second is the fact that the Court must take into account the provisions contained
in Article 56 of the African Charter, including exhaustion of domestic remedies
and avoiding insulting language. Third is the requirement that the Court take
steps to encourage amicable settlement. The final feature is the guarantee of
confidentiality. Each of these elements will be briefly considered and compared
with other regional human rights practices. Suggestions for possible
improvement will be made, but with a full awareness that this type of change
will probably only occur if the political dynamics of the Court are altered.
Lesotho, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa,
Togo, and Uganda.
76. AU, Decision on the Election of Judges of the African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights Doc. EX.CL/241 (VIII), Executive Council, Eighth Ordinary Session (Jan. 16-21, 2006),
EX.CL/Dec.261(VIII), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/
com/AU6th ord CouncilDecisions Jan2006 Khartoum.pdf. A list of judges with their biographies
is available at http://en.wikipedia.orgwiki/Judges of the African Court on Human and
Peoples'_Rights#Dr._Fatsah Ouguergouz .28ALGERIA.29.
77. Nick Tattersall, Africa Names Judges for New Human Rights Court, REUTERS (Jan. 22,
2006), http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/BLA251187.htm.
78. OAU, Opening Ceremony Remarks, Government Experts Meeting on the Establishment
of an African Court of [sic] Human and Peoples' Rights (Sept. 6-12, 1995), Cape Town, South
Africa, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPRRPT(I) Rev. I (on file with author).
79. Id.
80. Frans Viljoen has suggested another motive behind ratification of the Court that does not
depend on a commitment to human rights. This motivation is "the prospect of bidding to host the
African Court, an avenue open only to state parties to the Protocol." Viljoen, supra note 63, at 12.
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A. Individual Access to the African Court
Commenting on the Cape Town Draft, Tanzania said that if individual
access to the Court was optional, it would "make the protocol virtually in
operative [sic]." 8 1 Similarly, Burkina Faso's Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted
that individuals and NGOs should be able to access the Court directly because
"[i]t would not be realistic to exclude them from having access to the Court at a
time when on other continents texts are being revised to give them access to
international justice in the area of human rights." 82 This comment refers to the
fact that, in 1998, individuals were allowed direct access to the European Court
of Human Rights, a development that significantly improved the effectiveness of
human rights protection in Europe. 83 Indeed, the lack of such access to the Inter-
American Court has been one of its greatest weaknesses because it limits the
role of the victim and necessitates instead the intervention of the Inter-American
Commission which has to refer individual cases to the Court. 84 Unless African
states allow individual access, this will also be the practice in the African Court,
despite the fact that "[t]he right of individual petition, whereby individuals are
granted direct access to justice at the international level, is a defining
accomplishment of international human rights law. The essence of the
international protection of human rights is the opposition of individual
complainants to respondent states." 85
Not surprisingly, only one state, Burkina Faso, has currently made a
declaration allowing individuals to access the Court. Most countries, it seems,
share the sentiments expressed in a memorandum to the government of The
Gambia which commented that the optional individual access "safeguards the
integrity of the State and avoids vexatious and embarrassing actions being
81. OAU, Comments and Observations Received from Member States on the Draft Protocol
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, received at the Third
Government Legal Experts Meeting (Enlarged to Include Diplomats), Comments by Tanzania (Dec.
8-11, 1997), OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/Comm.(3), available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre
_publications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS%20LEADING%20UP%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLI
SHEMENT%200F%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%/o20p. 170.doc.
82. OAU, Comments and Observations Received from Member States on the Draft Protocol
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, received at the Third
Government Legal Experts Meeting (Enlarged to Include Diplomats), Comments by Burkina Faso
(Dec. 8-11, 1997), OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/Comm.(3), available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za
/centre publicationshrla/references/DOCUMENTS%20LEADING%20UP%20TO%20THE%20EST
ABLISHEMENT%200F%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p. 1 70.doc.
83. This direct access was introduced by Protocol 11 in Article 34 that replaced the previous
Article 26 of the Convention on Human Rights. See Vaughne Miller, Protocol 11 and the New
European Court of Human Rights, House of Commons Research Paper 98/109, Int'l Aff. & Def.
Sec. (Dec. 4, 1998), http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp98/rp98-109.pdf. See also
Christina Hioureas, supra note 15 at 723.
84. See PASQUALUCCI, supra note 12, at 98-99 (discussing how both the Inter-American
Court and Commission are giving petitioners more autonomy).
85. Antonio A.C. Trindade, The Consolidation of the Procedural Capacity of Individuals in
the Evolution of the International Protection of Human Rights: Present State and Perspectives at the
Turn of the Century, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 7 (1998).
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brought directly to the Court by NGOs and individuals." 8 6 Indeed, the states
must have known that few governments would allow individual access. As Julia
Harrington has commented: "The limitation on locus standi must be understood
as a cynical move to diminish what power the Court might have over States by
making it less accessible to those most likely to bring cases." 87 Harrington
hypothesized that one of the reasons for this tight restriction on individual access
might have been the influence of Nigeria during the drafting stages. At that time,
Nigeria was under the control of General Abacha's government, which had
"already given dramatic evidence of its disregard for human rights in general
and the African Commission in particular." 88 Given the secrecy that covers the
majority of the debates regarding the Court, it is hard to know Nigeria's exact
input, but "as the largest country in Africa and one of the most powerful in the
OAU, Nigeria surely made its presence felt."
89
B. Article 56 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples 'Rights
Another restrictive element of the Court's constituent instruments is the
fact that Article 6 of the Protocol establishing the Court states that, when ruling
on the admissibility of cases, the provisions of Article 56 of the African Charter
must be taken into account. This statement ensures that the Court is in line with
the procedure of the Commission, but it also introduces two elements that could
safeguard state sovereignty. The first element is that Article 56 of the African
Charter stipulates that domestic remedies must be exhausted before
communications can be accepted. This requirement is, of course, important
because it encourages domestic institutions to address human rights abuses and
would allow the Court to become a potential agent for change within individual
countries. 90 This function of a regional human rights court will be discussed in
Part III because it is essential to the growth of human rights standards within
Africa. However, a restricted application of the exhaustion requirement has
enormous potential to exclude individuals from the communications mechanism,
and it must therefore be applied carefully by the African Court.
It is essential, for example, that the Rules of Procedure for the Court
contain an explicit reference to the fact that the domestic remedies must be both
effective and adequate or exhaustion is not required. Article 31(2) of the Inter-
American Commission's Rules of Procedure, for example, makes this condition
86. The Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (a memorandum
addressed to the government of The Gambia that was endorsed by the Department of State for
Foreign Affairs) (on file with author).
87. Harrington, supra note 54, at 319.
88. ld.at 321.
89. Id.
90. Jo Pasqualucci has stated: "It is a generally recognized principle of international law that
a victim of human rights abuse must pursue and exhaust all available remedies in the local legal
system before resorting to an international forum." This can be seen in Article 46(1)(a) of the
American Convention on Human Rights and Article 26 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 12, at 129-30.
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explicit. 9 1 The African Commission has insisted on effective domestic remedies,
ruling in a 1995 case that: "It would be improper to insist on the complainant
seeking remedies from sources which do not operate impartially and have no
obligation to decide according to legal principles." 92 However, the Commission
has also issued inconsistent decisions that have interpreted the exhaustion of
domestic remedies rule strictly and out of line with its favorable precedents. In
Legal Defence Centre v. The Gambia, for example, which was decided in 2000,
the Commission ruled that there was a failure to exhaust domestic remedies even
though the petitioner was prohibited from reentering the state and therefore had
no access to the courts there.9 3 If the Court fails to pass judgment on inadequate
domestic remedies, it will do little to improve human rights protection within
African countries and will only continue to condone state violations.
In addition, if the requirement of Article 56 that communications cannot be
"written in disparaging or insulting language" is interpreted broadly, legitimate
and serious cases will be withheld from consideration. 94 It is likely that the
Commission will have already assessed this type of communication before it
reaches the Court, but it still remains a "dangerously subjective" criterion that
provides a potentially easy way for a complaint to be rendered inadmissible on
political grounds.
95
91. Article 31 of the Inter-American Commission's Rules of Procedure states that the need
to exhaust domestic remedies will not apply when: a) "the domestic legislation of the State
concerned does not afford due process of law for protection of the right or rights that have allegedly
been violated; b) the party alleging violation of his or her rights has been denied access to the
remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; c) there has been
unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies." Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Rules of Procedure, available at http://www. cdih.
oas.org/Basicos/basicl6.htm.
92. Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria (in respect of Wahab Akamu, G. Adega and
others), Afr. Comm'n Hum. & Peoples' Rts., Comm. No. 60/91, para. 10 (1995), available at
http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/60-91.html. See also International PEN, supra note
45, at para. 77 (ruling that because the complainants were deceased, there were no domestic
remedies that they could now seek and so the Commission could continue with the case); Media
Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, Afr. Comm'n Hum. & Peoples' Rts.,
Comm. Nos. 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96, para. 50 (1998), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/105-93_128-94_130-94_152-96.html
93. Legal Defence Centre v. The Gambia, Commission, Afr. Comm'n Hum. & Peoples'
Rts., Comm. No. 219/98, para. 17 (2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.
edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/219-98.html. See also Kenya Human Rights Commission v. Kenya,
Afr. Comm'n Hum. & Peoples' Rts., Comm. No. 135/94, para. 7 (1995), available at
http://wwwl.unm.edu/humanrts/aftica/comcases/135-94.html (failure to exhaust domestic remedies
in a case involving unlawful repression of a university union despite the Commission's admission
that the President of Kenya (who was also Chancellor of the university) stated "that the govemment
would never register ... [the union] despite the fact that the matter was already in court");
Mohammed Lamine Diakite v. Gabon, Afr. Comm'n Hum. & Peoples' Rts., Comm. No. 73/92,
paras. 14-17 (2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/73-92b.htm (no
exhaustion of remedies where complainant ordered expelled from Gabon on trumped up charges
because Commission found he had never contested the decision of expulsion).
94. See Ligue Camerounaise, supra note 5 I.
95. Chidi A. Odinkalu & Camilla Christensen, The African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights: The Development of its Non-State Communication Procedures, 20 HUM. RTS. Q.
235, 255 (1998) (observing how "it would be difficult to set objective standards for deciding, in the
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C. Amicable Settlement
Another problem with the constituent instruments is the amicable
settlement clause. Article 9 of the Protocol establishing the Court, states that the
institution "may try to reach an amicable settlement in a case pending before it
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter." 96 The African Charter only
explicitly mentions amicable settlement in state-to-state communications, but
the Commission has also applied such settlements to individuals' complaints.
97
If the Commission refers private party communications to the Court, then the
Court will also have to deal with amicable settlements between individuals and
states, and there is significant opportunity for the Court to abuse its discretion in
deference to member state interests. The Commission, for example, has not
always rigorously investigated the reasons for a complainant's silence before
concluding that the communication has been withdrawn. In Maria Baes v. Zaire,
the Commission concluded that the communication had been withdrawn because
the alleged victim had been released from prison and no further information was
received. 98 By ruling in this way, the Commission allowed Zaire to avoid
answering to charges of unlawful detention, in violation of Articles 6 and 7 of
the African Charter.99
Again, this type of ruling will lead to the protection of state sovereignty
rather than the championing of human rights, a bias that can only be avoided if
the Court's Rules of Procedure provide clear provisions regarding amicable
settlement. For example, there should be a presumption in the rules that a
settlement is not amicably settled unless the complainant and the state convey
otherwise through an express communication. In addition, the Court should, as
in the Inter-American system, be authorized to make follow-up inquiries. 10 0
context of adjudicating on violations of human rights, what constitutes 'disparaging or insulting
language' and pointing out that individuals are usually traumatized when they write these
complaints and tend to be writing in their second language).
96. Protocol establishing the Court, supra note 2, art. 9.
97. See INGER OSTERDAHL, IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: THE AFRICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATIONS 113-14, 125
(2002) (discussing how, despite the silence in the African Charter and the Commission's procedural
rules regarding amicable settlement with respect to individual communications, the Commission has
applied friendly settlement to individuals' cases).
98. The Commission found: "The author has failed to respond to inquiries from the
Commission which learns that the detained person had since been released. The author shows no
interest in pursuing the case. The Commission decides to close the file since the author has no
interest in proceeding with the case." Baes v. Zaire, Afr. Comm'n Hum. & Peoples' Rts., Comm.
No. 31/89, para. 2 (1995), available at http://wwwl.urn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/
allcases.html.
99. The communication was filed by a Danish national, Maria Baes, on behalf of Dr.
Shambuyi Naiadia Kandola. It was alleged that Kandola was "detained without charge in April 1988
for purely political reasons in breach of Articles 6 and 7 of the African Charter." Id. at para. 1.
Similar cases are discussed in OSTERDAHL, supra note 97, at 122.
100. Article 46(1) of the Inter-American Commission's Rules of Procedure states that the
Commission can, once it has published a report on friendly settlement, "adopt the follow-up
measures it deems appropriate, such as requesting information from the parties and holding hearings
in order to verify compliance with friendly settlement agreements and its recommendations." Inter-
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D. Confidentiality
Finally, state power is also retained if the proceedings of the Court are
confidential so that they are not open to external monitoring by civil society.
Article 10 of the Protocol establishing the Court states that the Court's
proceedings shall be held in public, which is a welcome development from the
heavy emphasis placed on confidentiality in the African Charter. 0 1 However, it
also notes that: "The Court may... conduct proceedings in camera as may be
provided for in the Rules of Procedure." 102 It is therefore important that these
Rules stipulate such confidentiality only in specific circumstances, where it is
necessary to protect the privacy of individuals. Otherwise, the African Heads of
State could exert improper influence over proceedings and, because of the
secrecy, external groups and complainants might not be provided with the
necessary information to object.
Overall, both the African Charter and the Protocol establishing the Court
contain important provisions that make it difficult to challenge state sovereignty.
These include not only the elements discussed above, but also provisions such as
the 'claw back clauses' contained in the African Charter. If states did, over the
years, decide that they wanted to make the Protocol establishing the Court more
binding, they could, of course, accept locus standi for individuals and NGOs. In
addition, Article 35 of the Protocol does allow for the possibility of amendment.
A State Party to the Protocol establishing the Court can propose a draft
amendment to the AHSG and this can then be adopted by a simple majority.
Alternatively, the Court may propose amendments through the Secretary-
General of the AU. However, the language of Article 35 is not entirely clear.
Article 35(3), for example, declares that amendments shall come into force "for
each State Party which has accepted" them. 10 3 It does not stipulate whether this
process requires a declaration or whether it is automatic if the state votes for the
amendment. Similarly, it is unclear what happens if a state votes for or against
an amendment and then changes its mind. Regardless, it seems unlikely that the
State Parties will be sufficiently motivated to amend the Protocol establishing
the Court any time soon, particularly as treaties have consistently "proved
remarkably resistant to change." 10
4
IV.
FOREIGN AID DONORS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
It is clear that African states made rational and purposeful decisions about
American Commission on Human Rights, Rules of Procedure, available at
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic16.htm.
101. Article 59 of the Charter states: "All measures taken within the provisions of the
present Chapter shall remain confidential until such a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government shall otherwise decide." African Charter, supra note 2, at art. 59.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Romano & Odinkalu, supra note 3, at 1.
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the nature of the Court, creating an institutional design that protected state
sovereignty. Their principal interest was not protecting human rights, but
avoiding accountability. Yet African leaders have made powerful statements
about the need to protect human rights. In 1995, for example, the Assistant-
General of the OAU argued that it was important to strengthen regional
institutions "to enable our continent to contribute with the rest of the world in
consolidating the respect and protection of human rights." 10 5 Similarly, the
OAU's 1999 Grand Bay Declaration noted "the growing recognition that
violations of human rights [in Africa] may constitute a burden for the
international community." 106 The new African Court, however, appears to be
principally a symbolic gesture. Some African politicians involved in the
negotiations to create the Court were undoubtedly committed to human rights
protection and see the Court as the next step in the slow process of creating an
effective regional system. Yet it is difficult to avoid the impression noted by
Osita Eze in her book on Africa that "[f]or the most part, a gap exists between
declaration [regarding human rights protection] and actual practice." 10 7
Given that the states' interests are focused principally on protecting their
sovereignty, it is necessary to change the political dynamics of the Court and to
alter states' priorities. The pressure required to shift these interests and priorities
is, however, substantial. As rational design theory emphasizes, states tend to
"use international institutions to further their own goals." 108 African countries
will therefore have to believe that it is in their own self-interest to make
financial contributions to the Court and to adhere to that institution's judgments.
Foreign aid donors are one group of outsiders that could generate this belief.
Foreign aid donors are in an unusually powerful position to influence
African states. They have huge leverage over African countries because aid
provides an important source of income for a large number of these states. 109 At
least twenty percent of Burkina Faso's government budget is financed by
foreign aid and, according to the US State Department, the country "has
excellent relations with European aid donors, as well as Libya, Taiwan and other
states which have offered financial aid. France and the EU in particular offer
significant aid. Other donors with large bilateral aid programs include Germany,
105. OAU, Statement by the OAU Assistant Secretary-General, H.E. Ambassador A.
Haggag at the Government's [sic] Experts Meeting on the Establishment of an African Court of [sic]
Human and People's [sic] Rights (Sept. 6-12, 1995), Cape Town, South Africa (on file with author).
106. OAU, Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action, OAU First Ministerial
Conference on Human Rights in Africa (Apr. 12-16, 1999), CONF/HRA/DECL (I), available at
http://www.africanreview.org/docs/rights/grandbBay.pdf.
107. OSITA C. EZE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: SOME SELECTED PROBLEMS 23 (1984).
108. Koremenos, supra note 3, at 762 (emphasis omitted).
109. From 1975-1995, just over half of central government expenditures of the fifty most
aid-dependent countries, the majority of which are in Africa, were funded by foreign aid. Jakob
Svensson, Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking, 51 J. INT'L ECON. 437, 438 (2000). In addition, "between
1960 and 2005, foreign aid worth more than $450 billion, inflation adjusted, poured into Africa."
Marian L. Tupy, Poverty that Defies Aid, WASH. TIMES, June 19, 2005 at B03.
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Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Canada."1 1 0 Similarly, Burundi, as the
poorest country in the world, is supported in large part by Western Europe,
though much of this aid was suspended after civil war broke out in 1993 and has
only just been resumed. 111 This type of relationship with donors is
representative of the majority of African countries that have both ratified and
refused to ratify the Protocol establishing the Court.
This final Part will therefore consider the role that foreign donors can play
in generating institutional change at the Court. It will briefly consider the
motivations for providing foreign aid and why donors might be concerned with
strengthening the Court. It will then describe how economic incentives have
been critical in the European human rights system and how, despite increasing
economic integration within Africa, African countries are currently unable to
provide such incentives. Finally, the Part will conclude by providing sample,
concrete proposals that could be tied to economic aid and will emphasize the
critical need for effective monitoring. It will look at three possible recipients of
aid: 1) the Court; 2) the countries that have ratified the Protocol establishing the
Court; and 3) African civil society. By funding all three recipients, donors can
ensure that the pressure for institutional change is maintained.
A. Donor Motivations
The incentives for providing aid are complex, and it is beyond the scope of
this paper to delve into donor motivations in any detail. It will suffice to
acknowledge that scholars have proposed a number of reasons why donors
decide to give foreign aid. Principal among these is the desire to promote
national interests and to provide money to states that enhance the donor's
political, economic or military goals.1 12 Domestic politics is said to play a role,
with pressure groups lobbying for aid donations and certain sections of the
donor's society benefiting from such contributions. 113 So why then would
110. U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note - Burkina Faso, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/
2834.htm.
111. On November 30, 2005, Germany gave the Burundian government nearly seventeen
million euros. This donation marked the end of the suspension of German aid. Burundi: Germany
Resumes Aid with 17 million euros for water, sanitation, IRINNEWS.ORG, Nov. 30, 2005,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=50423.
112. Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?, 5 J.
ECON. GROWTH 33 (2000) (noting how they found "considerable evidence that the direction of
foreign aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs
and policy performance of the recipients."). The US Congressional Research Service also
emphasized the strategic importance of foreign aid, stating: "Foreign assistance supports a great
many objectives. Especially since the September II terrorist attacks in the United States, foreign aid
has taken on a more strategic sense of importance, cast frequently in terms of contributing to the
global war on terrorism." Congressional Research Service, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview
of U.S. Programs and Policies (Apr. 15, 2004), http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/trade/files/98-
916.pdf.
113. Wolfgang Mayer & Pascalis Raimondos-Moller, The Politics of Foreign Aid: A Median
Voter Perspective, 7 REv. DEV. ECON. 165 (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-=411189
(presenting a model of how the voters in donor countries determine support for foreign aid).
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donors care about the success of the African Court? An answer to this question
can be broken into three parts: first, it is important to note that it is not unusual
for donors to contribute to regional courts; second, there are reasons why the
African Court in particular might serve a donor's national interests; third, donors
have become increasingly concerned with standards of good governance and
human rights in recipient states. For these reasons, it is possible that foreign aid
donors could become a force for institutional change.
1. Contributions to Regional Courts
The provision of foreign aid to regional human rights courts is not a new
phenomenon. While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact sources of funding for
most regional organizations, it is clear that the Inter-American Court has
received funding from both the EU and individual European countries. A 2004
report on the Inter-American Court's lack of financial sources noted that, "in
order to make up some financial shortfalls the IACHR [Inter-American Court of
Human Rights] has requested and obtained specific funds from member states of
the OAS [Organization of American States] and from friendly countries in
Europe."1 14 The report went on to add that: "In order to cover all its needs the
Commission will continue to seek additional resources from cooperation
agencies and friendly countries that wish to contribute to special projects and
specific funds."
' 115
Even more significant for the purposes of this paper is the fact that foreign
governments have already provided funding that was aimed at assisting in the
establishment of the African Court. In 2002, for example, the British Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) provided £92,573 to a project that aimed "to
promote early ratification of the Court Protocol for the African Court on Human
and Peoples' Rights." 116 In 2005, the FCO contributed £61,500 to another
project that "aimed to enhance the capacity of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights to fulfil its mandate to protect and promote human
rights in Africa through the creation of an African Court of Human Rights."' 1 17
In the same year, the FCO noted how "the UK continued to support the UK-
based NGO Interights to work with the African Union in assisting countries to
ratify the protocol [establishing the Court]... The UK welcomes the new
114. Financing the Inter-American Human Rights System, A Report Prepared by the Office
of the Secretary General of the OAS for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Human Rights (Apr. 28,
2000), http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/la/doc/fine.html [hereinafter Financing the Inter-American
System].
115. Id.
116. FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2003, Annex II: FCO Funding for Human Rights,
258 (2003) available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/servletlFront?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/
ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1028302592088.
117. FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2005, Annex II: GOF Projects, 258 (2005),
available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c =
Page&cid= 1028302592088.
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protocol."' 18
While it is interesting to note how national governments have already
funded projects to help develop the African Court, the motivations underlying
such contributions are unclear. In a recent study of foreign assistance provided
to international criminal tribunals, Steven Roper and Lilian Barria concluded:
"While we can rule out membership in the Security Council, regionalism and
colonialism as having an appreciable effect among all tribunals, this result is not
very satisfying. We are still at a loss to explain why countries contribute to
tribunals aside from as a general policy of foreign assistance."' 119 What is
undeniable, however, is that donor states somehow have to believe that it is in
their best interests to provide financial assistance to a court because this will
both spur the provision of money and allow politicians to justify their
actions. 1
20
2. The African Court Serving Donors' Interests
There are significant reasons why donors would want to strengthen a
regional human rights court in Africa. The Court is an important institution for
protecting human rights and could be a source for stability within the region.
Donors might desire a strong court in the belief that it will generate an
environment within Africa that is conducive to trade and the expansion of
foreign business. Certainly, there are clear indications that this factor might be a
powerful incentive. A 2004 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA) study emphasized how Africa was a continent with significant
118. FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2005, Chapter 4: Human Rights and International
Actions, 131 (2005), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/
Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid= 1119526503628.
119. Roper and Barria analyzed why countries provide voluntary contributions to war crimes
tribunals. They looked both at tribunals that have guaranteed funding under United Nations Chapter
VII (such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Yugoslavia) and at tribunals that depend on voluntary contributions (such as the Special Court of
Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chamber for Cambodia). The authors attempted to discover why
a state would give voluntary financial contributions when it was already providing funds through
Chapter VII and why, in addition, it might provide funds to a tribunal that is located in a country that
offers few strategic and economic benefits (such as Cambodia and Sierra Leone). As noted above,
the authors found it difficult to account for these actions. Roper & Barria, supra note 6, at 12.
120. The process of justification through self-interest is evident, for example, in the UK's
FCO report of 2003 which talks about British funding of the ICC. The FCO justified this financial
contribution in the following terms:
[G]iven that the Court is intended as a disincentive to future war criminals, the potential
human and economic savings are large. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was estimated to
have cost 0.8-1 million lives. Between 1997 (when a UK development programme for
Rwanda started) and 2002, the UK has contributed around £140 million in humanitarian
assistance and other financial aid - a substantial amount of which contributed to rebuilding
the country and its institutions following the conflict. Prior to 1997, the level of UK
development assistance was minimal.
FCO Departmental Report, Chapter 7: Quality of Life and a Strong International Community, 80
(2003), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/Show
Page&c=Page&cid=1051783486185.
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economic potential: "In recent years, the continent has begun to recover from
the 'lost decades' of the 1980s and 1990s. In 2003, Africa was the second fastest
growing region in the developing world, behind Eastern and Southern Asia."
' 12 1
In a US State Department article published on March 7, 2006, the strategic
importance of Africa was also highlighted: "Africa has evolved into a region of
key strategic importance to the United States, China and many other countries
worldwide as a supplier of energy and natural resources."
12 2
The principal factor that has hindered the growth of Africa's potential,
however, is the frequent recurrence of conflict and political instability. The
Court can play a role in resolving these conflicts by establishing a stronger
tradition of rule of law and by providing a forum where human rights violators
can be brought to justice. It can provide a stabilizing force to a region that is rich
in natural resources. Thus, foreign aid donors have clear incentives to encourage
the development of an effective Court. As Jack Straw, the British Foreign
Secretary, noted in 2003 in a section specifically about giving aid and support to
Africa:
British diplomacy is not only about international security and maintaining
relationships with key allies and partners. More than ever, it is also about working
to tackle poverty, root out human rights abuses and improve the quality of life of
all. There are moral imperatives for this approach. It is also in the UK's self-
interest. Prosperity, justice and security are increasingly intertwined. Our long-
term secugv depends on economic growth and political development
elsewhere.
Given that the Court could be a powerful force for justice in Africa,
funding this institution will arguably serve the self-interest of foreign aid donors.
3. Foreign Aid and Human Rights Standards
Over the last ten years, donors have begun to make foreign aid conditional
on good governance, rule of law and the protection of human rights, and so it is
likely that these donors could also be persuaded to emphasize commitments to
the African Court when making aid decisions. In a 1997 article, David Forsythe
noted that Western governments, the European Union and Japan had started
talking about human rights and democracy in their foreign aid programs. 124
During a speech in June 2005, President Bush stated that the link between
democracy and development was critical because experience had shown that
121. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, Overview, in ECONOMIC
REPORT ON AFRICA 2004: UNLOCKING AFRICA'S TRADE POTENTIAL (2004),
http://www.uneca.org/ERA2004/full.pdf.
122. Charles W. Corey, U.S. Dept. of State, Pan Africa: Africa of Key Strategic Importance
to U.S., World, Scholar Says, ALLAFRICA.COM, March 7, 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/
200603080122.html.
123. Jack Straw, Foreword to FCO Departmental Report 2003 (May 12, 2003),
http://www.fco.gov.uk/serviet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid = 10
51783486185.
124. David P. Forsythe, The United Nations, Human Rights, and Development, 19 HUM.
RTS. Q. 334, 338 (1997).
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"aid works best when certain conditions are in place such as a commitment to
just governance, respecting the rule of law, investing in citizens' health and
education, and opening up economies." 12 5 A related sentiment is reflected in the
Bush administration's Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) that expands
development assistance for countries that are "ruling justly, investing in their
people, and encouraging economic freedom."
126
This type of language is also included in the US African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA), a law that requires labor rights and human rights
protection as a requisite for cooperation with the United States. The annual
review of AGOA eligibility includes a careful examination of a state's human
rights record. 127 Similarly, as OXFAM Australia noted in a January 2001
report: "The UNDP, UNICEF, UNIFEM and a number of national governments
- notably the United Kingdom and Sweden - have adopted an explicitly human
rights approach to their development program." 128 Thus, an important group of
outsiders is already insisting on human rights protection as a fundamental
prerequisite for foreign aid, suggesting that donors could be persuaded to show
an interest in the development of the Court.
B. The Case for Change Through Aid
The potential effectiveness of tying economic incentives to demands for
institutional change is evident from developments made within Europe.
Members of the EU benefit greatly from financial integration with other
members and from the increased levels of investment and grants that flows from
membership. The criteria for EU membership requires candidates to achieve
"stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights
and respect for and protection of minorities."' 129 Turkey is just one country that
125. Lloyd 0. Pierson, African Organizations and Institutions: Positive Cross-Continental
Progress, Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations (Nov. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2005/tyO51ll7.html (quoting a speech made by President
George Bush on June 10, 2005).
126. Millennium Challenge Corporation, Frequently Asked Questions: How Does a Country
Become Eligible for MCA Assistance, http://www.mca.gov/about-us/faq/index.shtml (reporting
President George Bush's statement regarding required criteria).
127. "The Act authorizes the President to designate countries as eligible to receive the
benefits of AGOA if they are determined to have established, or are making continual progress
toward establishing the following: market-based economies; the rule of law and political pluralism;
elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; protection of intellectual property; efforts to
combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty, increasing availability of health care and educational
opportunities; protection of human rights and worker rights; and elimination of certain child labor
practices." African Growth and Opportunity Act, Country Eligibility, http://www.agoa.gov/
eligibility/countryeligibility.html.
128. OXFAM Australia, The Link Between Aid and Human Rights, Submission to the
Human Rights Sub Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.oxfam.org.au/campaigns/submissions/aidhumanrights.
pdf.
129. Conclusions of the European Council, Copenhagen, June 1993, quoted in Kristin
Archick, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: European Union Enlargement (May
2, 2005), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47070.pdf.
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has made significant domestic reforms so that it can qualify for membership,
moving away from a history of ethnic conflict. Human Rights Watch's 2005
report on Turkey notes how: "Since 1999, the promise of E.U. membership has
supported a dynamic process of reform." 130 Thus, in Turkey's case, the desire to
benefit from the financial gains of the EU has resulted in the evolution of
domestic institutions.
Obviously, if African states did not care about economic development, such
rewards would be less likely to make them change their priorities and allow the
Court to develop. For, as Yitan Li and A. Cooper Drury have stated, economic
engagement with countries that are poor and need reform is only effective when
a state "tie[s] its future to economic development and world trade." 131
Fortunately, there has been a great push within Africa in the last five years to
improve economic conditions. In a meeting between European and African
experts in December 2004, the AU made a statement that: "Never before has
Africa been so determined and resolute in her attempt to enhance socio-
economic conditions on the continent." 132 Over the last ten years, a number of
regional economic organizations have been created in Africa, including the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 133 the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), 134 the UN Economic Commission
for Africa (ECA), 13 5 and the African Development Bank (AfDB).136 Recently,
African leaders have also created the New Partnership for Africa's Development
(NEPAD), 13 7 an organization with the goal of eradicating poverty, promoting
sustainable development and increasing Africa's participation in the process of
globalization. NEPAD has been heralded as a welcome development by the
international community. The G8, for example, produced an African Action
Plan when NEPAD was formed that was "designed to encourage the imaginative
effort that underlies the NEPAD and to lay a solid foundation for future
130. A Crossroads for Human Rights?: Human Rights Watch's Key Concerns on Turkey for
2005, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/12/15/turkey9865.htm.
131. Yitan Li & A. Cooper Drury, Threatening Sanctions When Engagement Would be More
Effective: Attaining Better Human Rights in China, 5 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 378, 392 (2004).
132. AU, Africa's Position on Governance, Africa-Europe Enlarged Experts Meeting, Dec.
2-3, 2004, at 3, available at http://www.africa-union.org/NewsEvents/Calendar
of %20Events/AU-EU%20MEETING/4%20AFRICA's%20position%20in%20govemance.doc
[hereinafter Africa's Position on Governance].
133. The ECOWAS is a regional organization of fifteen West African nations, founded in
1975. ECOWAS, http://www.ecowas.info/.
134. SADC is a southern African regional organization that aims to integrate the economies
of member states. See generally South African Development Community,
http://www.sadc.int/index.php.
135. UNECA was established in 1958. It is a regional arm of the UN and is mandated to
support the economic and social development of member states. United Nations Economic
Commission For Africa, http://www.uneca.org/.
136. The AfDB was established in 1964 and is "a regional multilateral development finance
institution." African Development Bank Group, http://www.afdb.org/.
137. NEPAD is an organization established by the OAU to promote socio-economic
development in Africa. New Partnership for Africa's Development, What is NEPAD?,
http://www.nepad.org/.
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cooperation." 1
38
None of these African economic groups, however, have tied economic
incentives to the way in which states act towards the Court. Indeed, it is
questionable whether any of these organizations are, as yet, sufficiently
powerful to achieve such leverage. 139 The AU itself has admitted that: "Africa's
resource base is not yet strong enough to undertake all the activities needed to
enhance democracy and hence economic development."' 140 It therefore asked for
Europe's help: "The EU can therefore play its role as a constructive partner to
buttress Africa's efforts by providing strategic financial resources." 141
Similarly, it will probably require an outside force such as foreign donors to
provide the necessary leverage to generate institutional development within the
Court.
Such institutional change can only occur if the donors ensure two things.
First, they should make clear demands on the recipients of the aid. Second, they
must establish an effective and consistent monitoring system to check that these
demands are met. The remainder of this paper will offer some ideas for the types
of demands that could be made and how they could be monitored. These are not
exclusive suggestions but merely provide a starting point for possible change.
C. Concrete Proposals for Change
Foreign aid donors could provide money in three different ways, all of
which could be done concurrently. The first is to give the aid directly to the
Court. The second is to give the aid to individual states that have signed the
Protocol establishing the Court and are supportive of the Court's mission. The
third is to provide money to specific groups within African civil society that
have a mandate to promote and improve the Court. By providing aid to all three
recipients, donors can generate a dynamic force for institutional development.
However, as noted above, the provision of aid is of little use if it is not combined
with effective monitoring. Human rights systems have notoriously weak
monitoring, with the majority of states failing to cooperate with treaty bodies or
providing regular reports. This is precisely what allows states to use human
rights treaties for their symbolic function, without worrying about the actual
obligations undertaken. 142 Donors should therefore make thorough
138. G8 Summit Site, G8 African Action Plan, http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/
kananaskis/afraction-en.asp.
139. See, e.g., Bronwen Manby's recent article that assessed whether NEPAD can improve
the human rights situation in Africa. Manby concludes that NEPAD has "significant deficiencies"
that limit its effectiveness. Manby, supra note 17, at 983.
140. Africa's Position on Governance, supra note 132, at 10.
141. Id.
142. Oona Hathaway has suggested that states often ratify human rights treaties merely to
signal to other important actors that they are committed to human rights. She calls this signaling the
"expressive aspect of treaties." The actual ratification, she argues, is costless because human rights
treaties are rarely enforced. Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Ill
YALE L.J. 1935, 2007 (2002).
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investigations into whether the recipients are fulfilling the required
conditions. 143
1. Providing Aid to the Court
According to Article 32 of the Protocol establishing the Court, the
"[e]xpenses of the Court, emoluments and allowances for judges and the budget
of its registry, shall be determined and borne by the OAU, in accordance with
criteria laid down by the OAU in consultation with the Court." 14 4 As successor
to the OAU, the AU will now be responsible for funding the Court.
The Inter-American Court provides a clear example of the difficulties an
institution can face when it is funded by a regional organization. The Inter-
American Court has to deal with serious financial shortfalls because the
Organization of American States (OAS) does not allocate it sufficient funds. In a
2000 report on the financing of the Inter-American human rights system, it was
noted that:
Whereas the OAS sliends 5.2% of its budget on human rights, the European
Court of Human Rights enjoys a much greater budget priority within the work
of the Council of Europe (COE). Of the COE's 1999 total budget of over I
billion French Francs, 19% - roughly US $147m - went to the Court and other
human rights programs. 
145
If human rights are not made a priority by the states that constitute the AU,
the Court, like the African Commission, will find itself hampered by a lack of
funds. 146 As with the Inter-American Court, the African Court would probably
benefit from the assistance of foreign aid donors, which would at the least
ensure that the Court has adequate financial resources to fulfill its basic
functions. Yet, as the next section will emphasize, the foreign aid provided to
the Court should not replace the funds given by the African states because these
individual contributions play an important role in the politics of human rights.
In order to encourage institutional development, the donors should make
clear demands regarding the Court's function. It is important to note, however,
that the requirements stipulated by the donors should not be too rigid or too
extensive because this will restrict the growth of the Court and the freedom of
the judges to develop their own body of jurisprudence. When Dean Claudio
Grossman, President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
requested additional funds from the OAS, he stated that: "Increased funding
143. At present, such monitoring (and consequent sanctions) is not undertaken in a
consistent manner. One example is that of President Bush, who has continued to allow AGOA
eligibility to states such as Rwanda, Eritrea and Cote d'lvoire whose human rights conditions are
notoriously poor. See Bush Trip to Africa, July 2003, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/bush-africa2k3.htm (declaring that, "[b]y failing to consistently
use AGOA to press for an end to abuses in recipient countries, the administration risks squandering a
potentially useful tool in the promotion of human rights in Africa") [hereinafter Bush Trip, 2003].
144. Protocol establishing the Court, supra note 2, art. 32.
145. Financing the Inter-American System, supra note 114.
146. See discussion regarding the Commission's lack of funds, supra Part I.C.
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must be earmarked for institutional strengthening of the organs, which must
enjoy the autonomy necessary to decide how to utilize the additional resources
according to their needs and development strategies." 14 7 Similarly, the Court
should have a large amount of autonomy with only specific, limited
requirements being made by donors.
Such requirements could involve certain areas of the court's jurisprudence.
For example, the donors could insist that the exhaustion of domestic remedies be
dependent on whether the remedies are fair and effective. Similarly, the
proceedings of the Court should be made as public as possible. Another
extremely important area of the Court's functioning is the election of judges.
Amnesty International stated in 2004 that: "The effectiveness and efficiency of
the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights will depend on the
appointment of highly qualified judges with a strong commitment to human
rights." 148 Already, criticisms have been leveled against the January 2006
election of judges. Before the first eleven judges were elected, "an expert
Coalition of African Jurists, National Human Rights Institutions, and NGOs...
declared that the process of electing judges for the proposed African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights is 'substantially' flawed." 149 This group claimed
that the process lacked transparency and that the candidates did not have
sufficient experience in human rights. 150 Donors could tie the money they
provide to the Court to certain goals regarding judicial independence and human
rights experience. In other words, they could simply ensure that the Court
reaches the standards that were agreed to in the Protocol establishing the
Court. 
15 1
In order to assure compliance with these standards, the donors should
establish a monitoring group that would, ideally, be composed of independent
experts that could submit reports on the operation of the Court. This group could
provide training to the judges and provide workshops and literature to NGOs
and individuals who wish to bring a case before the Court. Training could also
147. Dean Claudio Grossman, President of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, In the Context of the Dialogue on the Improvement of the Inter-American Human Rights
System, Address Before the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs of the Permanent Council
of the OAS, Washington, D.C. (May 3, 2001), http://www.cidh.org/Discursos/05.03.01eng.htm.
148. Al Press Release, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Only the Best
Qualified Candidates Should be Appointed Judges, Al Index: IOR 10/001/2004 (Feb. 17, 2004),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIORl 00012004?open&of-ENG-375.
149. Coalition for an Effective African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Khartoum
Unsuitable to Elect Judges of the African Human Rights Court (Jan. 19, 2006),
http://www.amtdatatechnologies.com/acc/UploadedDocuments/l 19200614003PM218.doc. See also
Alexis Unkovic, Africa Rights Court Judge Nomination Process Slammed for Lack of Transparency,
JURIST, Jan. 21, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/01/africa-rights-court-judge-nominat
ion.php.
150. Id.
15 1. For example, Article 11 of the Protocol establishing the Court states that judges should
be selected "from among jurists of high moral character and of recognized practical, judicial or
academic competence and experience in the field of human and peoples' rights." Article 17 states:
"The independence of the judges shall be fully ensured in accordance with international law."
Protocol establishing the Court, supra note 2, arts. 11, 17.
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be provided to improve the interaction between the Commission and the Court.
As a result, the Court would not be as rigidly locked into its institutional design,
nor would it be as hampered by the states' desire to protect their sovereignty.
2. Providing Aid to Individual States that Have Signed the Protocol
establishing the Court
While providing money directly to the Court might help with its basic
operating costs and enable it to survive the vicissitudes of AU funding, the
provision of aid directly to a human rights court could be problematic. This is
because of the uniquely political nature of human rights systems and the fact
that every state should be forced to participate by providing funding. This issue
was addressed by the Secretary-General of the OAS who, while discussing
external funding of the Inter-American Court, noted that:
A basic operating premise from which our human rights mechanism derives
much of its power and legitimacy, is that the member states themselves fund it.
There is even some tension that derives from the fact that some countries within
the system donate more funds to the system than others. The farther we move
away from the notion that the entire membership funds their own human rights
enforcement mechanism, the more distortions and tension are likely to
obtain. 152
Thus, while direct funding to the Court might ensure that the institution
does not collapse, and could provide some pressure for institutional reform, this
should not replace AU funding provided by individual African countries. Rather,
the most immediate way in which donors could influence the institutional design
of the Court would be through demands they make to individual state recipients
of aid.
If money was given to individual states, it could be tailored so that there
were different levels of aid, the top ranks of which would be given on more
favorable terms. The states that qualify for the "best" types of aid would be
those that have ratified the Protocol establishing the Court and have made a
declaration accepting individual applications. This aid should be reduced,
however, if states fail to cooperate with the Court--either during proceedings, in
the monitoring process, or after a judgment has been handed down.
The Court's design, however, could be most effectively altered if
amendments were made to both the African Charter and the Protocol
establishing the Court. Article 68 of the African Charter allows for amendment
if a submission is made to the AU and the Commission has assessed the request.
It will then come into force if a simple majority of states approves the
amendment, but will only be effective in relation to states that have specifically
accepted it. Article 34 of the Protocol establishing the Court has similar
provisions. 153 Thus, the donors could provide incentives for individual states to
152. Financing the Inter-American System, supra note 114.
153. Protocol establishing the Court, supra note 2, art. 34.
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request and then accept amendments. In this way, the institutional design of the
Court could be altered in a concrete manner, especially if provisions such as the
'claw back clauses' of the African Charter were removed so that states could not
hide behind the defense of domestic law.
Once again, monitoring is essential. An independent group of experts
should track the amount of funding provided to the AU by states and, in
particular, to the African Court. The most crucial element that needs to be
monitored, however, is the way in which domestic institutions in individual
countries enforce human rights. The Court can attempt to hold states
accountable for abuses, but if domestic institutions refuse to enforce the Court's
holdings or never provide an effective remedy for individual citizens, little will
be accomplished towards improving human rights within the region. One of the
reasons the European Court of Human Rights has been so effective is because it
has "achieved substantial compliance with its judgments by forging
relationships with domestic government institutions." The European Court
has also made it clear that it is a subsidiary to national systems rather than a
substitute for domestic courts. 155 Indeed, as Christina Hioureas notes in this
volume, one of the principal recommendations to deal with the overload of cases
currently submitted to the European Court is to ensure that Contracting States'
domestic remedies are adequate. In this way, individuals will not need to file
applications with the European Court of Human Rights. 
156
In order to strengthen domestic institutions within Africa, foreign aid
donors could provide the type of "strategic financial resources" requested by the
AU with regard to NEPAD that could fund local monitoring systems to
strengthen domestic institutions. 157 Such systems are probably best established
by African civil society because these groups are on the ground and are best
suited to monitor domestic actions. Additionally, the type of peer monitoring
mechanism established as part of NEPAD could play a role in strengthening
domestic courts. Under NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM),
states undertake to submit to and facilitate periodic peer reviews directed and
managed by a group of African "Eminent Persons," "to ascertain progress being
made towards achieving mutually agreed goals." 158 The EU has welcomed this
154. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 11, at 298.
155. Luzius Wildhaber, President of the European Court of Human Rights, has emphasized
how the European Court should not replace domestic courts, stating: "What is... not in doubt is that
these issues [constitutional issues regarding the fundamental rights of European citizens] are more
properly decided, in conformity with the subsidiary logic of the system of protection set up by the
European Convention on Human Rights, by the national judicial authorities themselves and notably
courts of constitutional jurisdiction. European control is a fail-safe device designed to catch the ones
that get away from the rigorous scrutiny of the national constitutional bodies. Luzius Wildhaber,
President of the European Court of Human Rights, The Place of the European Court of Human
Rights in the European Constitutional Landscape, Address at the Conference of European
Constitutional Courts Xllth Congress, 2 (2002), http://www.confcoconsteu.org/reports/Report
%20ECHR-EN.pdf.
156. See Christina Hioureas, supra note 15 at 726.
157. See Africa's Position on Governance, supra note 132, at 10.
158. NEPAD, African Peer Review Mechanism (ARPM) [sic]: Base Document, Sixth
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peer review system and has "offered to support the APRM, including through
the APRM Trust Fund and through the implementation of APRM
recommendations in the future."
159
States could be monitored by their peers to see if they are fulfilling two key
commitments that will help to ensure that domestic institutions adequately
protect human rights. The first is contained in Article 1 of the African Charter,
which declares that all ratifying states "shall recognize the rights, duties and
freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or
other measures to give effect to them." 160 The second is contained in Article 30
of the Protocol establishing the Court which reads: "The States Parties to the
present Protocol undertake to comply with the judgment in any case to which
they are parties within the time stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its
execution." 16 1 Just as the EU provides funds to assist the APRM, foreign donors
could guarantee financial assistance to this type of peer monitoring of domestic
institutions.
3. Providing Aid to African Civil Society
There is an understandably strong feeling in Africa that Africans should be
supported to help themselves. 162 In 1997, an OAU representative, Ambassador
Bah, "stressed the need for perseverance in all efforts aimed at ensuring that
Africa was empowered to deal with its own problems." 163 Indeed, African civil
society might appear to be better placed to influence the Court than a group of
foreign outsiders. However, this set of actors currently lacks the necessary
power and leverage over states that will be required to encourage national
administrations to change their interests and allow for institutional change. In a
publication on Inter-African Initiatives in the field of human rights,
INTERIGHTS noted the difficulties faced by African NGOs, particularly those
that were working to build inter-regional support. These groups were "hampered
by poor records and communications infrastructure and by having to deal with
governments that have historically been alien to and alienated from their own
Summit of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (Mar. 9, 2003),
in AU, The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), The African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM), AHSG, Thirty-Eight Ordinary Session of the OAU (July 8, 2002), AHG/235
(XXXVIII), Annex II, paras. 6, 15, available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr docs/aprm/
docsibook3.pdf.
159. Press Release, Luxembourg Presidency, European Union-African Ministerial Meeting,
Final Communiqu6 (Apr. 2005), www.eu2005.lu/en/actualities/communiques/2005/04/llue-ua-final/.
160. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 1.
161. Protocol establishing the Court, supra note 2, art. 30.
162. Gebreselassie Tesfamichael, In Africa, Just Help Us to Help Ourselves, WASH. POST,
July 24, 2005, available at Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/
develop/africa/2005/0724helpourselves.htm.
163. OAU, Remarks of Ambassador Mamadou Bah, Representative of the Secretary-
General, Nouakchott, Mauritania (Apr. 11-14, 1997), OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR/RPT(2) (on file
with author).
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people."' 164 The dangerous situation faced by many human rights defenders
within Africa was more emphatically expressed in a November 2005 report by
the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders that was
presented to the African Commission. This report drew attention to "the
worsening situation of human rights defenders in the African continent in 2005"
and observed how "this year was marked by numerous acts of violence,
including killings, against human rights defenders in a great number of
countries." 165 The report then documents in detail human rights defenders
across Africa who have been killed, threatened with death, tortured, threatened
and arbitrarily detained. 166 Thus, while NGOs and other elements of civil
society might gain strength in the future, it is currently difficult to predict how
they could provide the necessary incentives for the Court's evolution.
However, even though it might be best for foreign donors to focus initially
on the states and the Court itself, it is important to recognize that civil society
will ultimately play a significant role in pushing for institutional change. 16 7 For
this reason, donors should provide resources to civil society groups that are
working within Africa to influence the development of the Court. 168 Such
assistance is, in fact, already being allocated. For example, the British
Government currently provides funds to The Coalition for an Effective African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights,169 an organization that "is open to civil
society and non-governmental organizations from both within and outside
Africa who share its objectives." 170 These objectives include ensuring that all
164. Emma Playfair, Preface to BUILDING BRIDGES FOR RIGHTS: INTER-AFRICAN
INITIATIVES IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, at xi (Marguerite Garling & Chidi Anselm Odinkalu
eds. 2001).
165. The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Situation of Human
Rights Defenders, Submission to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Thirty-
Eighth Ordinary Session, (Nov. 2005), http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/cadhpbeng-2.pdf.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Harold H. Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.
L.J. 1397, 1409 (1998) (arguing that "[m]any efforts at human rights norm-internalization are begun
not by nation-states, but by 'transnational norm entrepreneurs,' private transnational organizations or
individuals who mobilize popular opinion and political support within their host country and abroad
for the development of a universal human rights norm"). Note too, however, how Oona Hathaway
emphasizes how the transformation created by Koh's norm entrepreneurs "can take decades to lead
to tangible change." Hathaway, supra note 142, at 2022.
168. There are, of course, difficulties associated with providing foreign aid to civil society.
Some groups do not want to be politically associated with foreign governments. And, even if these
groups manage to maintain a distance from their funders, they might be accused of pushing a foreign
agenda. This has, indeed, been a particular problem in Africa, where "African governments have
accused Western-backed NGOs of being closely aligned to the governments that fund them and
whose aid they distribute." For example, "Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe has led an assault on
NGOs with a draft law tightening registration and barring foreign funding for NGOs with political
and human rights programmes." Cris Chinaka, NGOs Tiptoe through Africa's Political Minefields,
REUTERS, Oct. 11, 2005, reproduced in Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos
/state/2005/10 11 tiptoe.htm.
169. The funding is provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, whose logo is at
the bottom of the organization's web page. The Coalition for an Effective Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/engabout-us.html.
170. Coalition for an Effective African Court on Human and People's [sic] Rights, About
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states sign the Protocol establishing the Court and that these states allow for
individual access to the Court. In addition, the organization focuses on the need
for a fair and transparent election of judges. There are other groups within
African civil society that work with the Court and receive foreign funding-
though not necessarily state funding-that could be a good target for foreign aid.
For example, in 2005, the MacArthur Foundation provided $400,000 to the
Alliance for Africa "in support of the establishment of an effective African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights."'171 In the same year, they provided
$395,000 to the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa "in
support of a project to develop litigation for the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights." 1
7 2
By providing aid to these types of organizations, while also putting
pressure on states and the Court, foreign aid providers could establish a dynamic
force for institutional change. In the immediate future, focus should be
concentrated on the states because they have the power to change the most
fundamental flaws in the Court's genetic design-namely, the lack of individual
access and the potential for proceedings to remain confidential. Ultimately,
however, the growth of civil society within Africa is crucial because it is this
more localized outside actor that is better placed to bring cases before the
regional system and to monitor domestic implementation of the Court's
decisions.
V.
CONCLUSION
At present, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights is an
institution that is so tightly bound by its constituent instruments that it will only
become involved in human fights protection by moving, like the chrysalis, "a
joint or two." 173 The community of states, which is one of the key actors at the
Court, 174 has focused more on safeguarding national sovereignty than protecting
human rights and so, in accordance with rational design theory, has created a
Court that serves their self-interest. There is, however, a possibility for change
arising from one crucial outside actor: foreign aid providers.
If foreign donors are able to initiate the type of institutional reform that is
necessary to make the Court effective, the Court itself will be able to pass
judgment on the failure of states to implement their human rights commitments.
It will be able to police the rule of law in the domestic realm, making the
African human rights system more effective. Indeed, this domestic influence is,
the Coalition, http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/engabout_us.html.
171. MacArthur Foundation, Human Rights and International Justice: Recent Grants,
http://www.macfound.org/site/c.lkLXJ8MQKrH/b.938985/k.7091/internationalGrantmakingHu
man-Rights -and-International-JusticeRecent-Grantshtm.
172. Id.
173. Ant and Chrysalis, supra note 1.
174. David D. Caron, supra note 4 at 415.
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for many African civil society activists, the Court's most significant function.
Halidou Ou6draogo, head of the Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme
(UIDH), commented soon after the Protocol establishing the Court came into
force: "With the [African] court we can put pressure on states to lessen their
hold on the [domestic] courts, which they use to massively violate human rights
throughout the region."
17 5
However, before the Court can itself become an agent of reform, states will
have to have their priorities altered and their interests changed. As a result, the
Court could begin to operate in a way that was not anticipated in its initial
design. If foreign donors impose the types of obligations and monitoring
outlined above, this type of institutional evolution might well be attained.
175. Michael Fleshman, Human Rights Move up on Africa's Agenda, 18 AFR. RENEWAL 10
(July 2004), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol I8no2/182human rights
.htm. The UIDH is a network of NGOs from about fifty African countries.
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